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THE POLICE POWER: AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF
LIMITING FIRST AMENDMENT GUARANTEES?
Introduction
Zoning is not a new concept,1 but its application by local
governments to restrict the location of adult entertainment
establishments has brought it recently into conflict with protected
forms of speech and expression under the first amendment.2 The
zoning power invested in local governments has historically been
expansive.' Courts normally defer to the legislative discretion
utilized in enacting zoning ordinances. This is premised in part
on the fact that they do not desire to limit that part of the public
welfare which may be enhanced by the'enactment of zoning
ordinances.' However, courts are not precluded from making a
determination that local governmental goals and purposes which
support the enactment of a zoning ordinance are so intrusive of
protected rights as to require careful judicial scrutiny.' Absent
such an intrusion into fundamental rights and personal liberties
by local zoning ordiances, the role of the judiciary in reviewing
the application of the zoning power is considered an extremely
narrow one.
Zoning ordinances which exclude adult entertainment
establishments from specified geographical areas generally have
been held to be a proper exercise of the police power and nor-
mally are not considered a violation of the due process clause or
1. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The uses of zoning ordinances by
municipalities as tools for land use control has existed for more than fifty years. After Euclid
few zoning ordinances have undergone constitutional disapproval by the United States Supreme
Court. However, constitutional challenge to zoning ordinances is commonplace today because
(1) the courts examine each case with respect to its peculiar factual situation, sometimes holding
that a zoning ordinance which is facially constitutional is unconstitutional as applied to a specific
piece of land; (2) city planners and lawyers involved with planning and zoning have been in-
strumental in developing creative new zoning methods which inevitably produce unique constitu-
tional questions; and (3) the rigid geographical pattern imposed by the application of zoning regula-
tions often lacks the requisite flexibility to accommodate the dynamics of growth within a com-
munity. I. R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.01 (2d ed. 1976).
2. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S.
873 (1976); Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1980); Stansberry v. Holmes,
613 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 616 F.2d 568, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980).
3. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). "The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive .... The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully pa-
trolled." Id. at 33.
4. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). In Belle Terre, the court noted
that in past decisions they had "refused to limit the concept of public welfare that may be en-
hanced by zoning regulations." Id. at 5. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 32-33.
5. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494-4, 499 (1977).
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the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Difficulties with
this generalization arise when the entertainment establishment is
a sexually oriented business providing adult films, pictures, books
and other items. This then raises the question of whether the
regulation of such businesses violates first amendment protection
of freedom of expression and speech.6 The resolution of this ques-
tion by the courts has not reflected consistency but rather evinces
a pattern of decisions in which different results are reached with
respect to the constitutional validity of zoning ordinances limiting
the locations of, or the types of uses permissible within, these
adult establishments.
7
It is this intrusion in the area of first amendment protections
by the application of zoning regulations that is the subject of this
comment. Three areas of inquiry are made. First, consideration
is given to the use of zoning ordinances and related statutes as
methods of regulating various types of "adult entertainment." Em-
phasis is placed upon the utilization of the zoning power to effect
limitations upon the first amendment freedom of expression.
Secondly, the judicial standards of review which apply to zoning
regulations that affect first amendment considerations are briefly
examined. Finally, the decision of the Supreme Court in Schad
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim8 is analyzed with respect to its
potential effects on the emerging area of law pertaining to limita-
tions upon the location of adult entertainment establishments
through the use of zoning ordinances.
THE USE OF THE ZONING POWER TO
REGULATE ADULT ENTERTAINMENT ESTABLISHMENTS
Prior to Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. ,' zoning or-
6. Annot., 1 A.L.R. 4th 1297 (1980).
7. Stansberry v. Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 616 F.2d 568, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980) (zoning ordinance requiring owner of sexually-oriented enterprise
to determine business is not within 1500 feet of designated buildings held to be a valid exercise
of the police power); Dandy Co., Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, County City Complex, 401
N.E.2d 1380 (Ind. App. 1980) (zoning ordinance limiting location of adult bookstores not un-
constitutional); Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978)
(preserving and improving the character of residential neighborhoods was sufficient to justify the
exclusion of adult movie theatres from residential areas).
The Supreme Court had indicated by way of dicta that it may be possible, under certain cir-
cumstances, for local governments totally to exclude adult establishments. Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim, 449 U.S. 897 (1980).
But cf Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Fla. 1978); Ellwest
Stereo Theatres, Inc. v. Byrd, 472 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
8. 449 U.S. 897 (1980).
9. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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dinances regulating adult entertainment establishments were
analyzed by the courts under traditional first amendment prin-
ciples. Such analyses typically resulted in local governments be-
ing permitted to regulate the time, place and manner in which
first amendment forms of expression were exercised if the ap-
plied zoning ordinances were not predicated on content-related
classifications of expression.' As mentioned above, the courts
have generally upheld limitations on the time, place and manner
of the exercise of the first amendment guarantees. Statutes and
ordinances which reasonably regulate the conditions in which
speech is expressed are considered minimal interferences with first
amendment rights. Therefore, "reasonable, nondiscriminatory im-
positions on otherwise protected speech" have normally been
upheld because the form of expression and the access to that form
are not significantly impeded." Content-based classifications are
suspect due to the potential risk that legislative evaluations of the
consequences of certain forms of speech would be affected by
their perceptions of its content.12
Under first amendment principles, obscene material is not
protected from local governmental and state regulation, but por-
nographic material does fall within the protection of the first
amendment. 3 The materials for sale by the adult entertainment
establishments regulated in Mini Theatres may have been includ-
ed within the definition of pornography, but were not considered
obscene. The Court considered these forms of expression to have
less protection than other forms of protected speech under the first
amendment.' Indeed the Court noted that "[e]ven though the First
Amendment protects communication in this area from total supres-
sion, we hold that the State may legitimately use the content of
these materials as the basis for placing them in a different
10. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (quoting New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). "Any restriction on expressive activity because of
its content would completely undercut the 'profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issue should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' "See Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 67; Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976); Cox v. Louisiana (1), 379 U.S. 536 (1965). See generally Note, Developments
in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427 (1978).
11. Note, Constitutional Law: Municipal Zoning Ordinance May Restrict Location of Adult
Motion Picture Theatres, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 479, 481-82 (1977).
12. See Note, supra note 10, at 1550 n.1.
13. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
14. 427 U.S. at 70. Speaking to the matter of differing degrees of protected expression, the
Court said, "We recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of
erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society's interest in pro-
tecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest
in untrammeled political debate." Id. (emphasis added).
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classification from other motion pictures.""5 Thus, Mini Theatres
was a departure from traditional principles which did not permit
regulations to limit protected forms of expression by content-based
classifications. However, reasonable regulations affecting the time,
place and manner of speech or expression were permissible, and
the reasonableness of such regulations was "determined by balanc-
ing the government's interest in the regulation against the extent
to which the regulation restricts a first amendment right."'6
In Taylor v. City of Chesapeake," the city required the owner
and operator of premises used for showing films and for bur-
lesque to get a certificate of occupancy before the business was
opened. The owner disregarded this regulation of the city's building
code and opened his establishment. The city sought and eventually
received an injunction against the owner requiring that he keep
his establishment closed until a certificate of occupancy was issued
to him. Consequently, he sought an injunction against interference
by the city and a declaration that the building code of Chesapeake
was unconstitutional as applied to him. The court found that even
if a burlesque show comes within the protection of the first amend-
ment this does not preclude it from being reasonably regulated
by local government. "[I]t should be noted that a legislative act
is justified if within the power of the body, if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the supression of free expression, and if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." 8
In 1972, a federal district court noted that the City of Athens,
Georgia, was reasonably regulating the location in which an adult
movie theater could operate.' 9 The zoning ordinance regulating
this theater did not preclude the showing of adult movies, but on-
ly limited the place of their showing."° Also that year, the court
of appeals found that an ordinance regulating public nuisances
15. Id. at 70-71.
16. 91 HARV. L. REv. at 1551. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562-64 (1975); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939);
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 683 (1978).
17. 312 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1970).
18. Id. at 717. The Supreme Court had earlier found that when "speech" and "nonspeech"
elements were "combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element [could] justify incidental limitations on the First Amend-
ment freedoms." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
19. 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 362 F. Supp. 1389 (M.D. Ga. 1972). In Euclid, the Supreme
Court spoke to the matter of the reasonableness of zoning regulations when it indicated that a
zoning ordinance should not be declared unconstitutional unless its "provisions are clearly ar-
bitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare." 272 U.S. at 395.
20. Forsyth, 362 F. Supp. at 1392-93.
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in Alabama was not patently unconstitutional, nor was it applied
unconstitutionally to a plaintiff who owned and operated an out-
door theater in which X-rated movies were shown.21 '
In Mini Theatres the Supreme Court reversed a court of ap-
peals judgment declaring unconstitutional a municipal ordinance
which required that adult theaters be licensed and municipal zon-
ing ordinances which provided that an adult movie theater must
not be located within 1,000 feet of any two other "regulated uses"
or within 500 feet of any residential area.22 By sustaining this
content-based regulation, the Supreme Court departed significantly
from its previous holdings regarding the distinction and classifica-
tion of protected forms of expression based on content. Since the
decision in Mini Theatres, municipalities have been able to "single
out adult book stores and theaters for special regulatory
treatment."23 In this plurality opinion, the Court sustained the or-
dinances against allegations that they were unconstitutionally vague
and that they constituted an illegal restraint on freedom of speech
or expression.2" The Court further noted that these ordinances
would not have a significant deterrent effect on adult films which
would be protected under the first amendment. The rationale for
this rests in the fact that the Court concluded that the creators
of such films would be in no way inhibited by these ordinances,
nor would those persons desiring to view these films have their
access to them denied by the ordinances.2" Although the Court
admits to the fact that these ordinances were content-based it fur-
ther noted that the "regulation of the place where such films may
be exhibited does not offend the First Amendment."26 Based upon
the reasoning of the plurality it would appear that a municipality
can restrict the location of theaters which show sexually explicit
films much as they do for other theaters and other commercial
establishments within their local area.
The dissent in Mini Theatres relied primarily on the or-
21. 80 Drive-In, Inc. v. Baxley, 468 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1972).
22. 427 U.S. at 52-54.
23. See Note, supra note 10, at 1556. See generally Stansberry v. Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285
(5th Cir. 1980), rehg denied, 616 F.2d 568 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980); Dandy
Co. v. Civil City of South Bend, County-City Complex, 401 N.E.2d 1380 (Ind. App. 1980);
Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City Council of Long Beach, 100 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 161 Cal. Rptr.
411 (2d Dist. 1980); Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1980).
24. 427 U.S. at 58-61.
25. Id. at 61-62. For examples of where the court discusses the question of access to pro-
tected forms of expression or the forums for expressing ideas see Erznoznik v. City of Jackson-
ville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117-118 (1972);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-86 (1949).
26. 427 U.S. at 63.
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dinance's failure to comply with traditional first amendment stan-
dards of review."7 Justice Stewart noted that the zoning ordinance
did not involve "a content-neutral time, place and manner restric-
tion, or a regulation of obscene expression or other speech that
is entitled to less than the full protection of the First Amendment."'
Justice Blackmun concluded that the ordinance was unconstitu-
tional on the ground of vagueness."9
The aftermath of the decision in Mini Theatres has been
significant, but maybe not as dramatic as some commentators had
forecast."0 It appears to be clear that the decision in Mini Theatres
has spurred a number of local governments to enact zoning or-
dinances which limit the location of adult entertainment
establishments." Traditionally, the federal courts have deferred
to local governments' assessments of the facts with respect to zon-
ing cases; however, it appears that since Mini Theatres the
Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to examine the fac-
tual basis surrounding the application of a zoning ordinance to
specific land uses and their relationship of the zoning ordinance
to the purposes and objectives for which it was enacted." Although
Mini Theatres broke with the Court's normal aversion toward
content-based ordinances, it would still appear that the Court ap-
proves of content-neutral ordinances. As one commentator has
27. Id. at 84-88 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 84-85. In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), the
Court noted that impermissible prior restraints on protected forms of expression were not justifiable
simply because there existed a private forum for that form of expression. Id. at 556. Quoting
from Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. at 163, the court stated, "One is not to have the exercise of
his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place." Id.
29. 427 U.S. at 88 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
30. See Note, Constitutional Law-Explicit Sex and the First Amendment, 42 Mo. L. REV.
461 (1977); Note, Content-Based Classifications of Protected Speech: A Less Vital Interest?-Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 1976 UTAH L. REV. 616 0976); NOTE, Zoning: Content
Classification for Adult Movie Theatres, 22 Loy. L. REv. 1079 (1976); Note, Regulating Loca-
tion of'Adult Theatres'on Basis of Film Content is Constitutional, 28 MERCER L. REV. 587 (1977).
31. See supra note 7. Generally, two approaches are taken to limiting the location of adult
entertainment establishments. First, some municipalities have attempted to concentrate these
businesses within certain zoning districts, thereby resulting in an agglomeration of adult enter-
tainment establishments with other related businesses. The net effect of such concentration is that
frequently the density of such businesses becomes so significant as to result in adverse conse-
quences to the city; e.g., increased crime in that area, traffic and parking problems, deterioration
in the physical structures within that district, and the exodus of non-related businesses from that
zone. Second, other communities have attempted to regulate adult establishments by having them dis-
persed throughout certain areas of the city, similar to the Detroit ordinance in Mini Theatres.
In this type of regulation, the municipality normally limits the location of the adult establishment
by precluding it from being within a specified distance of a related facility or within a specified
distance of certain protected uses, such as residences, churches and schools.
32. See Note, supra note 10, at 1559.
33. Id. at 1562.
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noted "[tihe importance of Young is its potential for application
in a wide variety of first amendment contexts, suggesting that in
future cases more weight may be given to state interests in
regulating the content of protected speech."
'4
One year after Mini Theatres, the Supreme Court handed
down a decision in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro,3" in which the Court invalidated a town ordinace that
prohibited "For Sale" or "Sold" signs from being posted on residen-
tial property within the township. The substantial governmental
interest of the town was to promote a stable, racially integrated
housing market. Officials of the town concluded that the presence
of a large number of "For Sale" or "Sold" signs posted on residential
property would encourge panic selling of property within the town
resulting in a change in the racial distribution. 6 The town argued
that the first amendment less directly affected Willingboro's or-
dinance because it limited only one method of communication.
The Court noted that such an observation was not without
significance in the first amendment analysis since laws regulating
time, place and manner of speech stand on a different footing from
laws precluding certain forms of speech. The ordinance was found
to be unconstitutional because it was not necessary to achieve the
community's purpose and the first amendment kept the city from
achieving its goal by "restricting the free flow of truthful
information." 7
JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR REVIEW OF ZONING ORDINANCES
AFFECTING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The Supreme Court has historically applied a two level ap-
proach to assess equal protection challenges. 8 The first level of
assessment is the rational basis or minimal scrutiny test, in which
the legislative classification must bear a rational realtionship to
34. R. L. Goldman, A Doctrine of Worthier Speech: Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 21 ST. Louis L. J. 281 (1977).
35. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
36. Id. at 94.
37. Id. at 95.
38. See Note, Equal Protection and the First Amendment: Zoning Away Skid Row, 31 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 713 (1977); Note, Content-Based Classifications of Protected Speech: A Less
Vital Interest?-Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.-1976 Utah L. Rev 616 (1976); Note,
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.: A Limit on First Amendment Protection, 12 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 391 (1976); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 -Forward: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972);
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Tenn -Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Four-
teenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
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the permissible legislative purpose. 9 Under this test, the statute
or ordinance in question has presumptive validity and the burden
of having the ordinance or statute set aside is upon the party
challenging the ordinance."0 In dealing with economic and social
legislation the Court has traditionally respected legislative
classifications charged with violating equal protection if those
classifications are "reasonable, not arbitrary" 1 and the classifica-
tion bears "a rational relationship to a state objective." 2 This is
the test that is normally applied in cases involving disputes over
zoning ordinances. "
The second level of judicial inquiry is utilized when the
legislative classification is based upon suspect criteria or infringes
upon a fundamental right." Judicial scrutiny is greater in the case
of this level of inquiry and, as a consequence, the legislative body
is required to demonstrate that the statute or ordinance promotes
a compelling governmental interest and that the legislative
classification is essential to the promotion of that governmental
interest. Generally, all legislative classifications objected to under
the minimal scrutiny test have been upheld, and those in which
the strict scrutiny test was applied have failed to meet the burden
of the test. "
The Court in Mini Theatres did not discuss which test of equal
protection should be applied in the case of a zoning ordinance
which affected first amendment rights. Instead the Court utilized
an intermediate standard that could include a "sliding-scale" under
which the scrutiny of the Court would vary according to whether
the alleged infringement by the legislative classification is substan-
tially related to those governmental purposes served by the statute
or ordinance.6 This three level inquiry into the constitutionality
of legislative classification has been utilized in several cases. 7
39. See McDonald v. Board of Education Comm'rs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
40. 394 U.S. at 809.
41. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 8 (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. at 415).
42. Id. (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
43. See generally Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
44. For cases holding that classifications are suspect see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971) (alienage); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), reh'g denied, 324 U.S.
885 (1944) (national origin); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex, in some cases).
45. See 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
46. 427 U.S. at 71 n.35.
47. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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The Supreme Court's indecision with respect to the use of
one test as the basis for their decision in equal protection challenges
has resulted in confusing signals to municipalities. However, it
appears the Court is in agreement that in equal protection
challenges intertwined with first amendment implications, it is
proper to determine whether there is a substantial governmental
purpose that is furthered by the selective treatment of certain forms
of expression. In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley"8 the
issue before the Court was the constitutionality of an ordinance
which prohibited certain types of picketing within a given distance
of a public school building. The Court invalidated the ordinance
because selective restrictions on protected forms of expression
"may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by
reference to content alone.""9 The Court did note that a substan-
tial governmental interest may exist which would support selec-
tive restrictions on expressive content but that the justification for
imposing such selective restrictions on expression must be careful-
ly scrutinized where such "expressive conduct [is] within the pro-
tection of the First Amendment.""0 In the case of Grayned v. City
of Rockford 1 an anti-noise ordinance was sustained because it was
"narrowly tailored to further Rockford's compelling interests in
having an undisrupted school session conducive to the students'
learning, and [did] not unnecessarily interfere with First Amend-
ment rights."" In neither case did the Court indicate what equal
protection test was proper in the assessment of content distinctions.
In Erzonznik v. City of Jacksonville,53 the Court held un-
constitutional an ordinance declaring an outdoor movie theater
a public nuisance if any film was shown exhibiting human nudity
that could be observed from a public street or public place." It
was pointed out by the Court that the Jacksonville ordinance
discriminated among movie films strictly on the basis of their con-
tent, and resulted in films depicting nudity being precluded from
drive-in theaters."5 The Court "conclude[d] that the limited privacy
48. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
49. Id. at 96.
50. Id. at 98-99.
51. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
52. id. at 119.
53. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
54. Id. at 207. The Court has on a number of occasions considered the first amendment right
of individuals as against the rights of privacy for those who are possibly unwilling viewers or
hearers. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Beard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949).
55. 422 U.S. at 211.
19821
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
interests of persons on the public streets cannot justify this cen-
sorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its content. " '
Although the Court did not elaborate on the equal protection test
used to assess the constitutionality of this ordinance, it did sug-
gest that the judicial scrutiny was somewhat greater than that of
the rational basis test."7
The language used in legislative enactments which impinges
upon first amendent rights must be narrowly specific,"8 and it may
not be vague,"9 overbroad, 0 nor impose a prior restraint6' upon
protected forms of expression. A basic tenet of due process under
the fourteenth amendment is that a legislative enactment would
be void for vagueness or overbreadth. 2 Challenges to statutes or
ordinances which are vague or overbroad have been consistently
permitted by the Supreme Court on the basis of the general pro-
scription of the statute or ordiance.6 '
Where an ordinance or statute defines sufficiently distinct
limits for its citizens, law enforcement officials and judges, it is
not impermissibly vague.5' However, a clear and precise legislative
enactment may be "overbroad" if its limitations prohibit constitu-
tionally protected conduct.65 Overbroad and vague statutes or or-
dinances limit privileged activity, and, therefore, whether one is
directly affected or not helps to establish one's standing to raise
an overbreadth challenge. 6
SCHAD V. BOROUGH OF MOUNT EPHRAIM
In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,7 the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional a local zoning ordinance which prohibited
live entertainment in any establishment located within the borough.
The owners of an adult bookstore located within a commercial
zone of the borough were issued an amusement license allowing
56. Id. at 212.
57. Id. at 215-17. See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (Black, J., concurring
and dissenting).
58. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
59. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108-14 (1972).
60. 408 U.S. at 114-15.
61. 425 U.S. at 617; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. at 558-59.
62. 408 U.S. at 114-15.
63. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 59 n.17; Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 216.
64. City of Chicago v. Fort, 46 llt.2d 12, 16, 262 N.E. 2d 473, 476 (1970).
65. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1967).
66. 408 U.S. at 114.
67. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
[Vol. 2:361
POLICE POWER
them to install coin-operated mechanisms which permitted
customers to watch adult films. Subsequently, the establishment
added a coin-operated mechanism which allowed customers to
watch a live dancer, normally nude, performing behind an enclosed
glass panel. Complaints were filed against the operator of the adult
establishment charging that its exhibition of live dancing con-
stituted a violation of Mount Ephraim's zoning ordinance.6" The
owners and operators of the adult establishment were found guil-
ty of violating the zoning ordanance in municipal court and were
fined. The appellants' appeal to county court resulted in a trial
de novo and they were again found guilty. The Appellate Divi-
sion of the Superior Court of New Jersey affirmed these convic-
tions in a per curiam opinion following essentially the reasons
given in the county court, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey
denied further review of this matter."9 The appellants appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States claiming "that the im-
position of criminal penalties under an ordinance prohibiting all
live entertainment, including nonobscene, nude dancing, violated
their rights of free expression guaranteed by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution." 7 Further,
since the Court sustained the appellants' first amendment challenge
68. The zoning ordinance of Mount Ephraim established three types of zoning districts. "R-l"
is a residential district designed for single-family dwellings. "R-2" is a residential district de-
signed for single-family dwellings, townhouses and garden apartments. "C" is a district designed
for commercial uses as specified in section 99-15 of the Mount Ephraim Code. Id. at 63 n. 1.
Section 99-15A denotes the purpose of the "C" commercial district:
A. Purpose. The purpose of this district is to provide areas for local and regional commer-
cial operations. The zone district pattern recognizes the strip commercial pattern which ex-
ists along Kings Highway and the Black Horse Pike. It is intended, however, to encourage
such existing uses and any new uses or redevelopment to improve upon the zoning districts
of greater depth, by encouraging shopping center-type development with buildings related
to each other in design, landscaping and site planning, and by requiring off-street parking,
controlled ingress and egress, greater building setbacks, buffer areas along property lines
adjacent to residential uses, and a concentration of commercial uses into fewer locations
to eliminate the strip pattern.
452 U.S. at 63-64 n.2.
Section 99-15B describes the permitted uses allowable in a "C" commercial district:
B. Principal permitted uses on the land and in buildings.
(1) Offices and banks; taverns; restaurants and luncheonettes for sit-down dinners on-
ly and with no drive-in facilities; automobile sales; retail stores, such as but not limited
to food, wearing apparel, millinery, fabrics, hardware, lumber, jewelry, paint, wallpaper,
appliances, flowers, gifts, books, stationery, pharmacy, liquors, cleaners, novelties, hob-
bies and toys, repair shops for shoes, jewels, clothes, and appliances; barbershops and beauty
salons; cleaners and laundries; pet stores; and nurseries. Offices may, in addition, be per-
mitted to a group of four (4) stores or more without additional parking, provided the offices
do not exceed the equivalent of twenty percent (20%) of the gross floor area of the stores.
(2) Motels.
452 U.S.at 63.
69. Id. at 65.
70. Id.
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to the zoning ordinance, it was not necessary for them to address
the additional contention by the appellants that the zoning or-
dinance, as applied to them, constituted a violation of due pro-
cess and equal protection.71
The Supreme Court, being compelled to follow the state court
findings that the Mount Ephraim zoning ordinance precluded all
live entertainment, concluded that this blanket prohibition against
live entertainment throughout the borough would also prohibit
many other forms of expression that have long been deemed to
be within the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments.7'
The forms of expression protected by these two amendments would
include "nudity alone" and, indeed, the state courts in this case
noted that nude dancing falls within first amendment protection.73
The appellants' claims were rooted in the first amendment
and, consequently, they relied upon the effects the zoning or-
dinance may have on the expressive activities of other individuals
as well as themselves .7' The Court has noted in the past that over-
broad laws, similar to vague ones, may adversely impinge upon
privileged activities, and thus the appellants would have standing
to challenge the overbreath of Mount Ephraim's zoning
71ordinance.
Local governments possess the broad power to enact zoning
ordinances to control land use within their boundaries, and its pro-
per exercise is an important factor in establishing a satisfactory
quality of life in local communities. However, this zoning power
"must be exercised within constitutional limits."7' The Court noted
that in most instances zoning ordinances are subject to judicial
review, and the standard of review is most often "determined by
the nature of the right assertedly threatened or violated rather than
by the power being exercised or the specific limitation imposed."'
Where simple property interests are adversely affected by the ap-
plication of a zoning ordinance the courts normally apply the ra-
tional basis test, in which the ordinance is studied to see if it ra-
71. Id. at 65 n.4.
72. Id. at 65. See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 61-62, rehg
denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546
(1975); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
73. Id. at 66. See also supra note 72.
74. Schad. 452 U.S. at 66.
75. Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)).
76. Schad, 452 U.S. at 68 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 514
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
77. Schad, 452 U.S. at 68 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945)).
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tionally relates to substantial governmental interests or purposes.78
Where the ordinance, however, infringes upon a protected right
"it must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently substan-
tial government interest."'9 Thus, the Court determined that it must
examine those governmental interests advanced by Mount Ephraim
to justify this regulation of protected expression and the means
chosen by the borough to further those interests. The justifica-
tions for this limitation on protected rights advanced by Mount
Ephraim were considered inadequate to allow the restriction of
the protected activity.8°
The borough also asserted that the zoning ordinance was a
reasonable time, place and manner restriction. However, the
locality failed to "identify the municipal interest making it
reasonable to exclude all commercial live entertainment but to
allow a variety of other commercial uses in the borough."" In
assessing the validity of the zoning prohibition as a time, place
and manner restriction, the Court examined the compatibility of
live entertainment with other normal activities in the commercial
zoning districts of the borough. The borough was unable to in-
troduce sufficient evidence to show that the live entertainment in
the adult establishment was incompatible with the other commer-
cial uses in that zoning district. 2 It was noted further by the Court
that to be a reasonable time, place and manner restriction, the
zoning ordinance must not only represent a substantial govern-
mental interest, but "also must leave open adequate alternative
channels of communiction." In this respect the case of Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., used as support by the borough,
was distinguished by the Court in that the challenged regulation
78. Id. However, the Court indicated that where a regulation is, in fact, reasonably related
to a substantial governmental interest, it is still possible for it to fail under the limited standard
of review (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. at 520; and Nectow v. City
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 72. The borough was contending the following justifications for the implementa-
tion and enforcement of its zoning ordinance: (1) live entertainment in the commercial district
would be in conflict with the uses that are normally found within said district; (2) live entertain-
ment may be excluded from this district in order for the borough to avoid problems typically
associated with live entertainment, such as parking and traffic, increased refuse accumulation,
and law enforcement; (3) that the zoning ordinance is a reasonable time, place and manner limita-
tion; and (4) that the opportunities for live entertainment are readily available in other areas of
the general community lying outside of the limits of the borough.
81. Id. at 74-75.
82. Id. at 75.
83. Id. at 75-76. See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York,
447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 at 771 (1976); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116, 118 (1972).
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did not totally exclude all adult entertainment establishments."8
Finally, Mount Ephraim contended that live entertainment,
particularly nude entertainment, was available in adjacent areas
to the borough. Further, the local government hypothesized that
with county-wide zoning it would be reasonable to expect that
live entertainment would be available in restricted areas of the
county and would not necessarily have to be available within the
residential communities of that county. The Court noted that such
contentions were fruitless in that (1) there was no county-wide
zoning in Camden County, (2) Mount Ephraim may constitutional-
ly impose its own zoning ordinances regardless of what the county
does, and (3) the borough introduced no evidence to support the
availability of live entertainment existing within the county adja-
cent to the limits of Mount Ephraim. 5 Quoting from Schneider
v. State, the Court said "one is not to have the exercise of his
liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea
that it may be exercised in some other place.""'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun elaborated on two
points which he considered to be ambiguous with respect to this
"emerging area of the law." 7 First, where a local government's
zoning ordinance infringes upon protected rights of expression
under the first amendment that local government should under-
stand that it is necessary for it "to articulate and support, a reasoned
and significant basis for its decision. This burden is by no means
insurmountable, but neither should it be viewed as de minimis. "
Second, communities who wish to eliminate certain forms of ex-
pression on the premise that these forms of expression are available
in adjacent areas or communities should consider their decision
carefully. Such a premise is weakened by the fact that a person's
access to protected forms of expression could seriously be inhibited
by the mere unavailability of similar forms in nearby communities,
and one's political voice in these nearby communities is minimal.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon courts to pay close attention to
such prohibitions in order to protect the guarantees of the first
amendment.89
Justices Powell and Stewart, in a concurring opinion, noted
that the borough failed to draw its zoning ordinance narrowly and
84. Schad, 452 U.S. at 76.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 76-77.
87. Id. at 77-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 77 (Blackmun. J., concurring).
89. Id. at 78 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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carefully so as to avoid the overbreadth and vagueness problems.
These two justices did, however, indicate that it would be possi-
ble through a carefully drawn zoning ordinance "to regulate or
ban all commercial public entertainment. "90 In concurring in the
judgment, Justice Stevens noted that the text of Mount Ephraim's
zoning ordinance was not sufficiently narrowly drawn nor was
it content-neutral, and the evidence introduced by the borough
did not support the contradiction of either of these findings.91
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented from
the opinion of the Court. They concluded that Mount Ephraim
merely was attempting to create and maintain a basically residential
community. To this end the borough, through the exercise of the
police power, had the right to determine the character of its own
community,"2 and thereby establish regulations which limit
undesirable uses within the community and provide for zoning
districts where family and community values may be maintained
within a generally residential context." Indeed, the dissent ap-
peared to contend that a serious first amendment issue was not
even before the Court, and that Mount Ephraim in no way was
attempting "to suppress the point of view of anyone or stifle any
category of ideas.""
The opinions in this case seemed to reflect an attempt to clarify
the Court's earlier decision pertaining to the application of zon-
ing regulations with restricted certain forms of protected expres-
sion. The Court rather clearly distinguished Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc. from the instant case. The Court's rationale
for invalidating Mount Ephraim's zoning ordinance was predicated
on at least four points, the first being that the borough's zoning
ordinance totally excluded live entertainment as a form of expres-
sion from any area of the city.9 Consequently, in attempting to
limit live nude entertainment the borough also precluded the
possibility of any form of live entertainment within its limits.
Secondly, the zoning ordinance was overbroad and vague, thereby
permitting the appellants to challenge the regulation because of
its impact on other forms of expression which may affect other
individuals.' In response to this overbreadth challenge the borough
90. Id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 84 (Stevens, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 85-86 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
93. Id. at 85 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
94. Id. at 88 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
95. Id. at 65.
96. Id. at 66.
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was unable to introduce evidence sufficient to justify the zoning
regulations with respect to its community development purposes
and objectives. Thirdly, the zoning regulation was not narrowly
drawn so as to further the purported purposes and interests of the
community in enacting the zoning regulations.97 It seems apparent
that the community could have chosen a more selective approach
to handling the problem of live entertainment in the borough which
would have been less intrusive upon protected rights under the
first amendment. Finally, the zoning regulation was not considered
a proper time, place and manner restriction because the borough
could not show that live entertainment was incompatible with the
activity normally found within their commercial zoning district
and that there were other adequate and alternative channels for
communicating these forms of expression.98
The Court did not clearly indicate what standard of review
was used in invalidating Mount Ephraim's zoning ordinance. There
were certain suggestions that the Court considered the rational
basis test inappropriate for reviewing this particular regulation,99
but at the same time it did not indicate that the compelling state
interest test was being applied as the standard of review." It would
appear, once again, that the Court has chosen an intermediate level
of analysis for determining the constitutionality of the zoning or-
dinance applied by the borough of Mount Ephraim."'1 The resolu-
tion of this case was more a matter of examining the factual situa-
tion presented and distinguishing it from other similar situations
that had been presented in other cases -a "sliding scale" or a case-
by-case review. This appears to be clearly supported by the fact
that four justices felt compelled to write in three concurrent opi-
nions their views of this area of the law. One might be inclined
to believe that Schad is a clarification of the Court's earlier posi-
tion in Mini Theatres and an attempt to apply more rigorous stan-
dards of review to zoning ordinances which impinge upon first
amendment rights. However, the fact that four justices expound-
ed upon their own ideas with respect to this area of the law in
concurring opinions and two other justices dissented from the ma-
jority opinion appears to suggest that this problem with a conflict
of zoning regulation and first amendment rights is still in a state
of flux.
97. Id. at 68.
98. Id. at 75.
99. Id. at 68-70.
100. Id.
101. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 71 n.35 (1976), reh'g denied,




The difficulties in assessing the implications of zoning regula-
tions upon first amendment protected expression are likely to recur
until the Supreme Court makes a definitive statement of the ra-
tionale it intends to use in disposing of such cases. The implica-
tions raised by such cases are normally of great magnitude and
derived from rather complex problems associated with the develop-
ment of urban areas. In most cases, zoning ordinances are designed
to protect and preserve the various residential, commercial and
industrial districts of cities and counties. In attempting to preserve
these districts many local governments, in their zeal, may desire
to protect residential areas through the strict limitation or total
exclusion of adult entertainment establishments. The purposes for
such regulations may lie within a justifiable governmental interest,
but the conflict will arise where such regulation seriously in-
fringes upon forms of expression protected by the first amend-
ment. It appears plausible that local government will continue to
enact zoning regulations and related ordinances which affect first
amendment rights in such a manner, particularly when rigorous
guidelines have not been set down by the decisions of the Supreme
Court with regard to these matters.
Until such time as the Supreme Court sets out definitive
guidelines regarding the control of adult entertainment
establishments, local governments should carefully draft such
regulations to avoid infringement upon protected rights based upon
content. A significant intrusion upon protected speech or expres-
sion may seem palatable by local standards, but intent to severe-
ly limit or control protected expression is likely to result in the
Supreme Court invalidating such regulation.
JAMES W. GLADDEN
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